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A Framework for Analysis
A PSYCHOLOGICAL
MODEL OF THE
BUDGETARY
PROCESS

Mary T. Soulier, Ph.D *
*The author would like to thank Don T. DeCoster of the Univer
sity of Washington for his comments and assistance in the pre
paration of this paper.

Budgets are one of the major tools
used by management to express a
plan of action and to control ac
tivities by contrasting actual efforts
with the plan [Welsch, 1971].
However, because management
control systems are created by peo
ple for planning and controlling peo
ple’s activities, they cannot be
viewed as only an accounting tech
nique. For the budgeting process to
be effective the budgeter must be
aware of both the organization’s
policies and structures and how the
operating personnel interact with the
planning and control process.
The importance of these variables
is underscored by management’s in
terest in such management control
systems as management by objec
tives, participative budgeting, and
responsibility accounting [Giblin
and Sanfilippo, 1978]. Yet, the im
pact of these systems on the in
dividuals being controlled can be so
negative that the system must be
phased out because of hostility. In
spite of reported difficulties [Newton,
1977], management has no choice
but to continue to seek planning and
control systems that will increase the
organization’s efficiency and effec
tiveness. The problem is to ensure
that the management control

systems do not leave the organiza
tion in worse shape than it was
before implementation. As one man
ager reported after a budgetary
system implementation failure, “We
thought management really meant it
when they said they wanted partici
pative budgeting, and everyone got
into act in developing their depart
mental budgets. Imagine our dis
satisfaction when they rejected our
departmental budgets and imposed
their own budgets. In fact, we lost
several excellent people as a result.”
A great deal of literature exists
concerning budget pressure, partici
pative management, organizational
conflict, budgetary communication,
and budgetary slack [DeCoster,
1975; Said, 1978]. The consensus of
this literature is that the appropriate
budgetary system and its implemen
tation techniques are dependent
upon organizational structure, man
agement strategies, corporate goals
and objectives, leadership style of
top management, and employee at
titudes, to name a few variables. This
can leave the budget director in the
quandary of how best to evaluate a
management control system to
assure that it facilitates the achieve
ment of organizational goals in an
efficient and effective manner.

The budget officer needs to pre
dict the impact of the management
control system on the personnel’s at
titudes and behavior. This entails
dealing with the processes the man
ager uses to infer the causes of ob
served behavior, both his/her own
and others. The question is: “What
causes do managers assign to a par
ticular success or failure, either their
own or that of a subordinate’s?” This
question is based on the belief that
the individual forms expectations of
success or failure on future tasks
based upon the causes which were
assigned as the results of past suc
cesses or failures [Weiner, 1970].
In a budgetary situation, the pro
cess of assigning causes formally
begins with the receipt of the budge
tary report comparing budgeted and
actual performance. The manager
then uses all available information
including personal observations,
contacts, and control system reports
to draw conclusions about the
causes of the success or failure of
the performance. Finally, the in
dividual makes a decision about
future behavior based on the
analysis [Frieze, 1976; Weiner,
1972].
For example, assume that a man
ager receives an accounting report
indicating a negative performance.
Then, assume that the manager
assigns the causes of the failure to
too tight a budget or insufficient
technical skills, rather than to lack of
effort. The expectation of the in
dividual would be that, regardless of
future effort, the probability of suc
cess on similar tasks in the future
would be very low. There will be little
reason for the manager to increase
effort toward the task performance.
If, however, the manager assigns the
cause of failure to an inappropriate
allocation of time or lack of effort,
then increased effort next period
might result in the successful
achievement of budgetary goals.
Three areas are of particular in
terest to the person setting budge
tary goals:
1. The information sought by the
individual to determine the
causes of the success or failure.
2. The grouping of causes used by
people; and
3. The effect of choosing specific
causes on future behavior.
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A Model of Budgeting
Exhibit 1 develops a model that is
relevant to the budgetary process. In
this model the budgetary process
begins with a translation of
organizational goals into an opera
tional budget (point A). This budget
may be either imposed by manage
ment or developed with the partici
pation of the subordinates. In ac
tuality, these two methods are proba
bly on opposite ends of a continuum
of budgetary practices with most
budgets having some combination
of both. It is through the operational
budget that the subordinate obtains
information concerning the
superior’s expectations of accepta
ble performance. It is also a state
ment of how the individual can
achieve personal goals; that is, rec
ognition, the opportunity to partici
pate in future decisions, promotion,
and monetary compensation.
After actual performance the con
trol phase begins (point B). During
this phase the first step, from the
subordinate’s perspective, is the
evaluation (interpretation) of per
formance as a success or failure. In
a budgetary setting, this comes in
the form of both formal and informal
feedback. Formal feedback would
come through a comparison of a per
formance budget with the actual per
formance data. The resulting
variances are evidence of the suc
cess (zero or positive variances) or
failure (negative variances) of meet
ing the budget. This is shown at
point C in Exhibit 1. As an example,
assume that an audit manager had a
performance time budget of 100
hours to accomplish a specific job.
When the actual hours of work were
totaled they were 20 percent above
budget; an unfavorable report.
As a next step this audit manager
would use available information to
determine why this failure happened.
The information sought can be
grouped into three classes of ques
tions. These questions group how a
person assesses the way current
behavior and results fit in with pre
vious behavior and results to create
an historical pattern. In our example
of an unfavorable time variance the
first question would be, “How am I
doing on different types of jobs?”
The second question has to do with
performance on the same type of job
across time. That is, “Have I received
other unfavorable variances on this
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type of job?” The third compares the
particular performance of the man
ager with other managers; “How do
other managers do on this job?”
These three questions help the
person decide if the performance
behavior was caused by factors
within the individual (e.g., a person’s
skill, personality, and/or effort) or
factors external to the individual
(e.g., a different task, biased
measures, and/or bad luck). If the
audit manager has done well on
most other jobs, has done well on
similar jobs, or if almost everyone
else who has worked on this job has
had unfavorable variances, a cause
external to the manager would be
implied. If, on the other hand, the
audit manager is doing poorly on
most other jobs, on other jobs of a
similar nature, and other managers
are doing well on this job, a cause
internal to the manager would be in
ferred.
Researchers have grouped per
ceived causes of success or failure
along two dimensions: (a) internal
external (control), and (b) stableunstable (stability). These two
dimensions are shown below.

The dimension of control refers to
whether the cause was thought of as
internal or external to the individual
performing the task. Ability, abnor
mal effort, and attitudes are all ex
amples of internal causes; job
difficulty, luck, and behavior of peers
are causes external to the individual.
The stability dimension refers to the
tendency of the causes to be
unchanging over time. For example,
personal ability and the tightness of
the budget would remain constant
for the individual in the short run. On
the other hand, the level of individual
effort could be modified from one ac
counting period to the next.

While there are many possible
causes that could be assigned to
success or failure, research has
shown that it is possible to condense
them into these four major catego
ries: ability level, the amount of effort
expended, the difficulty of the tasks,
and the amount and direction of
luck. These four categories, ex
plored in detail in successive sec
tions, have a direct impact upon
understanding the budgetary pro
cess.

LOCUS OF CONTROL

INTERNAL

EXTERNAL

STABLE

ability

task
difficulty

UNSTABLE

effort

luck
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E X H IB IT

I

A B udgetary M odel

In assigning either internal or
external causes, there is a
likelihood of
superior/subordinate bias.

Control Dimension
As stated earlier, the control
dimension pertains to whether the
cause of the success/failure was
perceived as internal (ability and
effort) or external (task difficulty and
luck) to the individual performing the
job. In assigning either internal or
external causes, there is a likelihood
of superior/subordinate bias. For ex
ample, the audit manager with the
unfavorable variance would likely
choose causal factors such as a
poor control system, biased
measurement systems, a more com
plex job than originally planned
resulting in too tight a budget, un
cooperative colleagues, inex
perienced staff, and unforeseen and
unavoidable events such as acts of
God. These are all external causes.
On the other hand, the supervisor of
the audit manager would more likely
assign internal causes such as little
supervisory experience, an abrasive
personality, lack of technical skills,
too little effort, or a nonprofessional
attitude toward the task. These are
all internal causes. The extent of this
bias could be a principal cause of
superior/subordinate conflict
[Weiner, 1974].

Stability Dimension
The stability dimension pertains to
the likelihood that the causes can be
changed, at least in the short run. If
past behavior on a job was attributed
by the audit manager to the stable
factors of ability and/or task
difficulty, there would be little expec
tation that in the short run results
would change. If the outcomes of the
previous performance were ascribed
to the unstable elements of luck or
effort, expectations of suc
cess/failure can change. Therefore,
shifts in expectancies of the in
6/The Woman CPA, January, 1980

dividual are primarily determined by
the stability of the cause.
At the point of determination of
causes, shown as point D in Exhibit
1, a combination of ability, task
difficulty, effort, and luck will be
chosen as causes of behavior. The
audit manager will assign causes to
the control and stability dimensions
with some weighting of importance
dependent, in part, upon the suc
cess/failure results. These historical
causes are then used to form new ex
pectations. In this way the historical
causes help explain the manager’s
views of past performance while
simultaneously affecting future
behavior.
If the audit manager in our exam
ple chose the causal factors of poor
production systems, uncooperative
colleagues, too tight a budget, inex
perienced staff, or lack of proper
training on his/her part, the causes
could be grouped under the stable
dimensions of ability and task
difficulty. The audit manager could
be expected to make the logical
deductions that faced with these
conditions again on a similar job,
there would be the same results of
unfavorable time variances. And,
since these factors will not change
in the short run, the audit manager
would not likely increase effort. If,
however, the manager had chosen
an unstable factor, such as lack of
effort, s/he might logically conclude
that increased personal effort would
lead to a favorable variance next
time. Here, the audit manager would
likely increase effort next time. Cer
tainly this is of interest in the budge
tary control process since it can be a
useful way of predicting future
behavior of managers as well as a
way of examining superior/subord
inate conflicts.

Policy Implications
Research from social psychology,
organization theory, and behavioral
accounting support the validity of
this framework [Soulier, 1978]. There
is evidence to show that:
1. People do assign causes to
results which affect their future
expectations;
2. The causes can be grouped
along the two dimensions of
control and stability;
3. There is bias in choosing
causes of behavior; that is, the
manager will more likely
assign external causes while

the superior will more likely
assign internal causes.
4. Individuals who receive success
feedback will more likely
choose internal causes (deci
sion-making ability and effort)
and be more satisfied while
those receiving failure feedback
will more likely choose external
causes (task difficulty and luck)
and be less satisfied.

Success/Failure Implications
The policy implications of
research findings on success/failure
feedback using the framework
developed are startling since they
contradict many of the motivational
assumptions made in budgetary
literature. The literature often sug
gests that budgets should be set at
levels achievable 25 to 40 per cent of
the time to achieve maximum per
formance. According to the frame
work developed above, people who
receive continuous or frequent
failure feedback increasingly assign
more external causes of task
difficulty and bad luck. As a result
their expectancies of future success
decrease. The manager would not
expect to succeed and probably
would put forth less effort; there
would be no reason to work harder.

Importance and Satisfaction
The literature suggests that failure
feedback also has the impact of
causing managers to lower their
psychological importance of suc
cessful task performance. This is the
exact opposite of the effect desired
when giving feedback. Instead of
motivating the manager to work
harder to accomplish the job in the
budgeted time, the negative feed
back will cause the individual to
decrease the psychological impor
tance of the task to themselves.
In addition to affecting psy
chological importance, success or
failure feedback can also affect
manager satisfaction. Research has
shown that when failure occurs, the
individual has decreased levels of
satisfaction. The model developed
above offers provocative insights to
this situation. The decreased
satisfaction is not because the in
dividual attributes the failure to inter
nal factors that can be improved
upon. Rather, it occurs because the
individual attributes the failure to ex
ternal factors which implies that the
individual has lost control of the
situation.

The budgetary process really
starts with the assignment of
causes for last period’s
success or failure and the
behavioral expectations
arising from the causes.

Manipulation of Success
or Failure
These findings have obvious
policy implications. First, manage
ment is likely to create dissatisfac
tion among subordinates when
budget levels are set so high that the
majority of feedback is negative.
Since success and failure are
defined in relationship to the
benchmarks budgeted at the begin
ning of the accounting period, they
are judgmental criteria of perform
ance that become absolute values. A
failure in one situation can be
changed to a success by simply
changing the benchmark data.
Satisfaction is not directly depen
dent on the absolute level at which
the budget was set; rather it depends
upon whether the individual believes
s/he was successful in job ac
complishment.
However, an additional problem
may arise. As the individual believes
s/he is more successful, higher
levels of effort will be perceived in
reaching successful task ac
complishment. From a management
point of view this is a two-edged
sword. If the budget is set so high
that the individual receives failure
feedback, the individual will assume
lack of personal control, decrease
expectancies of future successes,
lower the level of effort, and
decrease satisfaction. But, on the
other hand, if management sets the
budget levels lower so that success
feedback will be prevalent, in
dividuals will take more personal
credit for the results, increase expec
tancies of future successes, perceive
themselves as putting forth more
effort, and become more satisfied.
This seems desirable; but in putting
forth more effort, theories of equity
say that the individual is going to ex
pect more rewards. Yet this would be

unjustified unless the success feed
back was based upon valid in
creases in the firm’s effectiveness
and efficiency. Certainly, the setting
of acceptable budget levels appears
to be an art, not a science.
Another implication is important to
the budget director. Too often the
budget process is defined as begin
ning with the definition of the budget
goals and ending when the control
reports are presented and acted
upon. This overlooks the obvious —
the budgetary process really starts
with the assignment of causes for
last period’s success or failure and
the behavioral expectations arising
from the causes.

Mary T. Soulier, Ph.D., is Assistant
Professor of Accounting at Seattle
University. A member of the AAA and
the seattle chapter of the ASWA, she
has been active in professional
development programs in manage
ment and educational accounting.
She has been engaged in research
and writing on the effect of account
ing information on the management
control process and is currently serv
ing on the review board of The Ac
counting Review.

Conclusions
There is no doubt that the budget
director must continue to seek ways
of understanding and explaining the
interaction of the human being with
the budget system. The failure to
seek answers to these human ques
tions can lower the effectiveness and
efficiency of the budget, and
ultimately the firm. The model
developed can offer new insights in
evaluating specific budgetary policy
decisions.
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